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Abstract 
The present study adds to the growing literature on union formation in case of uncertainty by 
proposing an operational distinction between actual constraints and perceived uncertainty 
regarding the future. Using longitudinal data from 17 waves of the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia survey, we empirically disentangle objective employment-
related constraints, their subjective perception, and perceived uncertainty about the future on 
the hazard of entry into the first union. Our results corroborate the notion that, alone, 
objective measures give only a partial and possibly inaccurate perspective: the specter of the 
future also matters. Relevant differences in selection into first union are observed according to 
the level of uncertainty faced by individuals. Moreover, our findings reveal a nonlinear 
relationship between uncertainty and family formation. Faced by either very low or very high 
uncertainty, individuals who are employed tend to invest their resources in family 
formation—a trend which may well be respectively encouraged or discouraged by the state of 
the labor market. With mid-levels of uncertainty, individuals may instead prefer to invest into 
the labor market and postpone union formation. 
 
Keywords: Employment conditions; Perceived employment uncertainty; First unions; 
Australia. 
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Introduction 
The link between family dynamics and economic conditions has received renewed attention in 
the era of uncertainty (Mills and Blossfeld 2013). Kohler and colleagues (2002) were among 
the firsts to argue that individual-level economic uncertainty contributed to delay union 
formation and childbearing in early adulthood in favor of a prolonged residence in the 
parental home so as to better pursue higher education or job stability (see also Blossfeld et al. 
2005). Comolli et al. (2019) advocated that the recent rise in uncertainty is a result of today’s 
world becoming much more interconnected than before. Similarly, Vignoli et al. (2020) 
argued that the increasing speed, dynamics, and volatility of globalization outcomes—and the 
exponential rate of technological change—makes it increasingly difficult for individuals to 
imagine their future, and choose between alterative family formation strategies.  
We contribute to this growing literature on the economic uncertainty/family dynamics nexus 
in two ways. First, we focus on the first step towards family formation: the entry into first 
union. Various studies have shown that youth unemployment, term-limited working contracts, 
and unstable employment inhibit childbearing (Barbieri et al. 2015; Kreyenfeld and 
Andersson 2014; Özcan et al. 2010; Pailhé and Solaz 2012; Vignoli et al. 2012). These 
studies, however, have tended to focus on a selected group—those already in established 
couples (e.g., Busetta et al. 2019; Vignoli et al. 2019). As unemployment and jobs with 
uncertain conditions often reflect a partnership sorting mechanism, individuals—especially 
men—with truly unstable careers are more likely to not be in a co-residential relationship 
(Kim 2017; Piotrowski et al. 2015; Vignoli et al. 2016). Hence, much of the recent literature 
on fertility has disregarded a crucial first step into the family formation process, namely the 
selection into first union (Kohler et al. 2002). As such, the current study pursues this line of 
enquiry by stepping back in the life course and scrutinizing patterns of union formation in 
case of uncertainty. 
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Second, we propose an operational distinction between objective constraints and perceived 
uncertainty about the future. Economic uncertainty has been customarily considered an 
individual risk factor, mainly related to unfavorable labor market conditions, such as 
unemployment, short-term contract jobs, or a combination of these factors (Scherer 2009; 
Kreyenfeld et al. 2012; Mills and Blossfeld 2013). Recent advances also consider subjective 
measures of employment conditions (Kreyenfeld 2010; Bhaumik and Nugent 2011; Hofmann 
and Hohmeyer 2013; Fahlén and Oláh 2018). Aside from the perception of security of one’s 
own employment situation, however, economic uncertainty is primarily defined as a lack of 
clarity about future economic prospects (Bloom 2014), or, simply put, unknown probability 
distributions to possible outcomes (Beckert 1996). In a context in which (bounded) rational 
calculations of opportunities and constraints concerning family decisions are obfuscated by 
increasing uncertainty, recent advances in family demography posit that actors’ choices are 
influenced by the “shadow of the future”, namely the (more or less) uncertain expectations of 
the future (Bernardi et al. 2019; Vignoli et al. 2020). We follow such a debate by empirically 
disentangling objective constraints, their subjective perception, and perceived uncertainty 
about the future. 
The empirical analysis focuses on Australia by utilizing longitudinal data from the Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (hereafter referred to as the HILDA survey). The 
country is characterized by a stable economy. The Great Recession of 2008 had little or no 
effect on its economy and labor market participation—for instance, unemployment rates 
remained hovering at around 6% (against approximately 4% before the 2008 financial crisis). 
From 2000 to 2016, female labor force participation rose from 65% to 72%, while male 
participation in the labor market remained at approximately 82% (data from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics – Labor Force 2000–2016). Having a relatively stable labor market that is 
only slightly affected by the macro-level economic and financial fluctuations makes Australia 
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an interesting case study. Our analysis thus provides new insights to whether and how 
individual-level perceived uncertainty influence family-building processes, net of objective 
actual constraints, in a relatively stable economic and financial context. 
Australia, as a context, is also interesting since it is a country with a high incidence of non-
standard employment (Buddelmeyer et al. 2015). This study considers two forms of 
contingent (Polivka and Nardone 1989) employment: casual employment and fixed-term 
contracts. Casual employment contracts are relatively common in Australia. In 2019, there 
were 2.6 million casual workers who accounted for 24.4% of total employees (data from the 
ABS – Australian Bureau of Statistics). This type of contract is especially prevalent among 
young workers: in 2016, almost 80% of employees aged 15–19 and 40% of 20–24-year-old 
workers were in casual employment. Despite they are entitled to a wage premium to 
compensate unstable hours worked and the absence of entitlements to various employment 
benefits, and despite the fact there is a large presence in the Australia labor market of 
individuals with a long history of “stable causal” employment (ACTU 2012), casual jobs are 
seen as insecure and poorly paid and with poor employment perspective (Buddelmeyer and 
Wooden 2011; Watson 2013). Casual workers are likely to suffer fluctuations in their 
earnings with irregular and insufficient work hours, have poor mental health, and lower levels 
of job satisfactions (Buddelmeyer et al. 2015); in addition, they are not entitled to paid leave 
(including maternity leave). Fixed-term workers are instead entitled to welfare protection 
measures similar to those with permanent contracts but face the uncertainty of being 
considered redundant at the end of each term.  
This paper focuses on the entry into first union. We consider both legal marriages 
(“marriage”) and de facto relationships (“de facto”). The latter—defined in Australia by the 
Family Law Act 1975 – 4AA—refers to a couple cohabiting on a genuine domestic basis but 
without being legally married. While certain Australian states and territories ask couples to 
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register a de facto relationship, it is not compulsory. In practice, couples in de facto 
relationships and legal marriages have equal rights before the law. In Australia, being in a de 
facto relationship is often a pre-step before marriage. In 2017, almost 80% of married couples 
cohabited before getting married. In the mid-1970s, this figure was closer to 16% (ABS data). 
McDonald and Evans (2003) found a similar pattern between marriage and de facto when 
comparing several Australian cohorts. A de facto relationship can thus be seen as a “try before 
you buy” phase (Perelli-Harris et al. 2014). For this reason, and since we study the transition 
to the first union that is likely to be a cohabitation, we consider entrance in first union as 
either entrance in first de facto or first legal marriage, whichever occurs first.  
 
Employment uncertainty and union formation 
Employment uncertainty may hinder or delay family formation (Ranjan 1999). Patterns of 
union formation represent adaptations to accelerated globalization, rapid economic 
restructuring (e.g., the gig economy and the decline in stable jobs), and growing income and 
wealth inequality (Sassler and Lichter 2020). The implications for marriage and cohabitation 
of the Great Recession and its recovery have received a great deal of scholarly attention in 
recent years (Cherlin et al. 2018; Schneider and Hastings 2015). In line with the globalization 
perspective (Blossfeld et al. 2005; Mills and Blossfeld 2013), marriage—a resource-intensive 
and long-term commitment—is likely to be postponed when people face employment 
uncertainty until their outlook on life is more optimistic (Golsh 2003; Vignoli et al. 2016). 
According to the uncertainty hypothesis developed by Oppenheimer (1988), uncertainty is 
embodied by (especially men’s) unstable careers, as indicated by low-status jobs, non-
employment, and irregular and temporary employment. This employment uncertainty impedes 
assortative mating and may therefore delay marriage. Furthermore, the spread of job 
precariousness jeopardizes financial resources, thus potentially acting as a barrier to marriage 
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or a wedding ceremony (Livi Bacci 2008). American research generally supports the view 
that poor economic prospects for men and women are associated with a delay in marriage in 
favor of cohabitation (see Sassler and Leichter 2020). European results suggest that working 
in nonregular or fixed-term jobs, or garnering only temporary work contracts, significantly 
reduces the likelihood of entering into marital unions (Piotrowski et al. 2015; Vignoli et al. 
2016). For example, Bukodi (2012) showed that job instability or downward career 
trajectories tend to depress the marriage rates among those entering marriage-age cohorts in 
the United Kingdom. Studies on socio-economic determinants of first union formation in 
Australia report results in line with those found in other contexts: individuals with unstable 
employment conditions—in particular unemployed males and/or those with lower levels of 
education—are more likely to postpone union formation (e.g., Evans 2015; Heard 2011).  
Despite this boom in the literature, the empirical evidence on the economic uncertainty/union 
formation nexus remains inconclusive. Past research has failed to recognize that individuals, 
depending on the extent to which they feel and tolerate uncertainty, might differ in their 
reactions and decision-making in uncertain economic situations (Bernardi et al. 2009; 
Kreyenfeld 2010). Beckert and Bronk (2018) recognized that the presence of uncertainty is 
one of the salient characteristics of a capitalist society. However, the need for individuals to 
make decisions remains, regardless of whether uncertainty hinders the possibility of rational 
calculations concerning future events. Imagination and the ability to devise and anticipate 
different scenarios play a major role in future-planning. In this framework, assessing the 
degree of perceived employment uncertainty means evaluating the expectations attached to 
different aspects of employment life.  
Another crucial limitation of previous studies is that they have tended to overlook the role of 
the strength of uncertainty. Bhaumik and Nugent (2006) posited that the “net effect of 
uncertainty” on the value of the option to postpone family formation depends on the degree of 
8 
 
uncertainty: a moderate increase in uncertainty would increase the chances of postponing or 
avoiding pregnancy, but, beyond a certain threshold, further increases are of less significance 
when individuals have little to lose, and may instead even raise the probability of childbirth. 
According to the narrative inspired by the socio-psychological uncertainty reduction theory 
developed by Friedman and colleagues (1994), the decision to marry may indeed serve as a 
strategy to reduce biographical uncertainty. This theory contends that uncertainty reduction is 
an immanent value whose reduction will always be sought by rational actors. Accordingly, 
women may respond to unfavorable employment prospects by choosing the “alternative 
career” of wives (and mothers) to give structure to an otherwise uncertain life course. While 
previous research has, at best, tested a monotonically positive or negative relationship 
between economic uncertainty and family formation, this paper will explicitly consider the 
possibility of a non-monotonous relation. This is intended as an effective and interesting 
alternative view with which to explain the economic uncertainty/family formation nexus. 
Against this backdrop, the present study addresses two research questions:  
1) Objective or perceived (future) uncertainty? What is the relative importance of perception 
of employment uncertainty on entrance into first union?  
2) Does the relationship between uncertainty and family formation follow a non-monotonous 
pattern? 
 
Data 
This paper draws on longitudinal data from the first 17 waves of the HILDA survey. HILDA 
is a nationally representative household-based panel study which began in 2001. Each year, 
the study collects a variety of information from each person aged 15 and older living in the 
household at the time of the interview. As a baseline (2001), 13,969 people from 7,682 
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households were interviewed. In 2011, a top-up sample of 2,153 households were added 
(Watson and Wooden 2002).  
We considered individuals aged between 15–35 who could possibly enter into their first union 
(9,459 individuals who had never been in a legal marriage or de facto relationship before). We 
started at age 15 as, by law, 16 is the minimum age at which a person can legally marry in 
Australia. 
We further excluded those who would have been in education throughout the entire 
observational period (449) due to the study’s interest in examining the effect of employment 
uncertainty on family formation. Hence, we selected individuals who were, at least 
potentially, active on the labor market. 
In order to have the same set of individuals for all the analysis—and since our interest lies in 
both subjective and objectives measures of uncertainty, and their prospective effect—we only 
kept a record when the respondent reported both sets of measures (which occurred in 95.58% 
of all cases). Since we lagged the measures of one wave in order to avoid reverse causality 
issues, we restricted the analysis only to those with valid information on at least two 
consecutive waves. We ended up with an analytic sample of 5,855 individuals (2,727 women 
and 3,128 men) for a total of 24,775 respondent-wave observations.  
 
Variables 
Outcome variable. We estimated the transition into first union (either a de facto relationship 
or legal marriage) using a discrete time event history model. The outcome variable is coded as 
a 0 (being single) or 1 (being in a union). 
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Uncertainty measures. Unlike previous studies, our aim was to test the relative importance of 
both subjective and objective working uncertainty measures. The measures used in the present 
study were as follows: 
a) Employment status and characteristics (objective employment condition). We considered 
whether the person was unemployed or outside the labor force. Additionally, HILDA 
distinguishes among permanent or ongoing contracts, fixed-term, casual basis, and being 
self-employed. Due to the prevalence of young workers in casual employment and the 
peculiarities of this type of non-standard working contract, we will consider fixed terms 
contracts and casual contracts as two separate forms of contingent employment. 
 
b) Subjective measures. We explored three possible subjective measures: the satisfaction 
over actual job security, and two forward-looking measures of employment uncertainty. 
One refers to satisfaction regarding current employment condition, and two refer to future 
employment prospects. 
1. Satisfaction of job security. The question reads as follows: “I want you to pick a 
number between 0 and 10 to indicate how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with your 
job security.” The variable ranged from 0 to 10. Since the distribution of the responses 
is highly skewed (distribution of responses is available upon request) we have 
discretized the variable into low satisfaction (from 0 to 5) and high satisfaction (6 to 
10). 
2. Probability of losing a job. Q: “I would like you to think about your employment 
prospects over the next 12 months. What do you think is the percent chance that you 
will lose your job during the next 12 months? By loss of job, I mean getting fired, 
being laid off or retrenched, being made redundant, or having your contract not 
renewed.” 
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3. Probability of finding a job. Q: “I would like you to think about your employment 
prospects over the next 12 months. What do you think is the percent chance you will 
find a suitable job during the next 12 months?” 
The responses ranges from 0 to 100. The distribution of responses is highly skewed with 
peaks around round numbers (0, 5, 10, 20, 50 and so on). Considering the distribution of 
responses (available upon request) and for ease of interpretation, we discretized the 
probability of losing one’s job into three categories (no chances of losing job, below 50%, 
50% and over). The chance of finding a job was discretized into four categories: “heavily 
discouraged of finding a job” (0 to 10% chance); “discouraged” (from 10 to 50%); 
“optimistic” (50 to 80%); “very optimistic” (80% and over). See Table 1 (below) for 
descriptive statistics of subjective and objective measures of uncertainty.  
Sociodemographic characteristics. In the multivariate model, we controlled both for the age 
(in its quadratic form) and socioeconomic status of the respondent. In particular, the level of 
education of each respondent was coded in three levels (compulsory or below, diploma, 
bachelor or above) and parental occupational level (highest level between parents) using the 
ISCO-based classification mentioned below. We further controlled for the most recent 
occupational level, using the ISCO-88 one-digit level code for the current (at t-1) or most 
recent type of occupation. We distinguish between high skilled white collar (ISCO codes 1, 2, 
or 3); low skilled white collar (ISCO codes 4 and 5); high skilled blue collar (ISCO codes 6 
and 7), and low skilled blue collar (ISCO codes 8 and 9). 
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Method 
We used a discrete time event history model to analyze the effect of experiencing uncertainty 
in the labor market on the propensity of entering into first union.  
A discrete time event history model is analogous to a random effect logit model, we estimated 
then the following models:  
 (1) 
 (2) 
 
 
(3) 
In these models, u represents the random effects, while X is the aforementioned set of time 
varying and time invariant sociodemographic characteristics. All time varying covariates were 
lagged so as to avoid possible issues of reverse causality. 
As a first step, we estimated the effect of employment condition on the likelihood of first 
union. The second step involved examining the perception of employment uncertainty. Lastly, 
we estimated the final model with both objective and subjective measures. Since we 
established three measures of perceived uncertainty, models 2 and 3 were run separately for 
each perceived measure. As we suspected the effect would be strongly gendered, we stratified 
the analysis by gender. 
We computed the average marginal effects (AMEs) to interpret any changes across groups 
(Mood, 2010). AME expresses the effect on P (Y = 1) as a categorical covariate changes from 
one category to another or as a continuous covariate increases by one unit, averaged across 
the values of the other covariates introduced in the model. 
We defined entering into a union as either starting one’s (first) de facto relationship or legally 
marrying one’s partner—whichever was the first to occur. Legal marriage and beginning a de 
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facto relationship could be considered as two competing events since legal marriage implies a   
stronger commitment than a de facto (Baxter et al. 2015). However, in our sample—and as 
shown elsewhere (Perelli-Harris et al. 2014, Evans 2015)—being in a de facto seems to be a 
pre-step before marriage. In several cases, the transition from single to de facto is followed (in 
a relatively short amount of time) by the transition from de facto to marriage. Since the two 
events do not seem to be in direct competition, and as the legal rights for both sets of couples 
are the same, we decided to refer to both as a (first) union formation event. Nevertheless, as 
robustness checks we opted to run both a competing risk model with both types of unions, and 
considering entrance in first union in terms of getting legally married, a resource-intensive 
and long-term type of commitment. Once done, we found no specific pattern to suggest a 
different attitude between legal marriage and de facto in our study (results available upon 
request). Moreover, since in our data legal marriage often comes after a de facto (i.e., we have 
few cases in which the first union was directly a legal marriage), to have more robust 
estimates our empirical strategy is to consider both legal marriage and de facto as entry into 
the first union. 
  
Results  
Descriptive results 
In our analytic sample, 41.47% of women reported a temporary casual job, against 30.28% for 
men (see Table 1). Women were also more often outside of the labor force (8.38% versus 
6.79%). Nevertheless, both men and women reported similar levels of uncertainty. On a scale 
of 0 to 10, respondents of both genders reported approximately an 8-point level of satisfaction 
of job security and, if unemployed, the perceived chance of finding a suitable job (resilience) 
in the next 12 months was at roughly 73%. The perceived chance of losing job among the 
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employed for both genders was approximately 12%. Dividing by employment condition, 
perceived uncertainty is higher among those in contingent jobs. For instance, among men the 
perceived chance of losing job next year is around 13% for fixed terms and casual workers 
(13.3% and 13.2% respectively) and 9% for those with a permanent position. Similarly, men 
in causal employment reports a satisfaction of job security around 7.8 points versus 8.3 of 
workers with an on-going contract. 
 [TABLE 1 HERE] 
Thanks to the longitudinal perspective of the data, we were able to verify whether the 
subjective measures could be viewed as reliable indicators of employment positioning. Table 
2 compares the response at time (t-1) with the employment condition in the following wave. 
By way of a reference, we also reported on the transition probabilities between employment 
conditions (i.e., being employed or not). Non-standard employments (casual and fixed terms) 
are by definition uncertain (Polivka and Nardone, 1989), and characterized by a lack of 
guarantee of permanency. 16% of those in a casual employment are not employed in the 
following year against 10.30% among fixed terms workers and 7.79% of those with a 
permanent position. The results for all three subjective indicators showed that respondents 
were able to correctly evaluate their condition. For instance, an increase in optimism about the 
chance of finding a job was linked to an increase in actually finding one, as shown by the 
following assessment. However, feeling secure in one’s position (perceived high job security 
satisfaction or low/zero chances of losing the job) does not completely protect against actual 
job loss (which occurred in roughly 11% of cases). See also Dickerson and Green (2012) for a 
general discussion on the validity of subjective measures of employment insecurity. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
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Multivariate Model 
Employment condition. In the first model specification, we considered the link between 
structural conditions (i.e., the type of contract) and the propensity of union formation. Figure 
1 depicts the average marginal effects of objective labor market positioning on union 
formation. As expected, being outside the labor force or being unemployed were shown to 
hinder the transition to first union for both men and women. We found an AME of -0.063 and 
-0.053, respectively, for men and women outside the labor force and of -0.025 and -0.043 for 
the unemployed. Similar behavior was observed amongst self-employed workers and those 
with an ongoing contract. The type of non-standard employment plays a role. With respect to 
workers with ongoing permanent contracts, a precarious worker with a casual job is more 
likely to postpone the entrance in a union (AME of -0.023 among men and of -0.035 among 
women). Notably, we instead found no statistically significant differences in the propensity to 
start the first union between permanent workers and those with fixed-term contracts. This 
finding is substantial, as it evidences the importance of recognizing temporary workers as 
constituting a heterogeneous group. The two types of contingent contracts (causal and fixed 
term) are indeed different. Casual employees have no right to paid leave and have a tendency 
to work more hours. Conversely, fixed-term workers have similar employment protection to 
permanent workers and, as mentioned above, have the right to ask for an ongoing position 
after a certain number of years of fixed-term employment with the same employer.  
The effects of the control covariates were as initially expected, thereby providing us with an 
indirect validation of the statistical model itself. Age has a positive and nonlinear effect on the 
probability of starting first union. Higher levels of education or highly skilled jobs (ISCO 
code 1, 2, and 3) facilitate the creation of first union (Evans 2015). The full results for the 
multivariate model can be found in the appendix. 
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Fig. 1 Probability of entering into a first union by types of contract. Average Marginal Effect. 
 
Note. Reference category: Permanent position. Model controlling for age (quadratic form), level of education, 
occupational level and parental background. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1 
 
Job satisfaction. Whereas the satisfaction regarding one’s current job alone (model 2) seemed 
to have no relevant association with the transition to first union among men (see Table 3 - 
Model 2 in the appendix), women who reported lower levels of job security satisfaction had a 
decreased chances of entering into a union (AME of -0.022). 
Considering both employment condition and the subjective measure of job security (model 3), 
it is interesting to observe their effects on workers with permanent contracts (see Figure 2 or 
Table 3 – Model 3 for complete results). Employed women, even with low levels of job 
security satisfaction (score below 5), tended to postpone entering into first union (average 
marginal effect of -0.065). While it should be noted that the estimates were not statistically 
precise, it is worth examining the relevance of perceived job security among temporary 
workers with fixed-term contracts. For both men and women, the lower the levels of 
satisfaction, the higher the chance of postponing a union.  
Due to the distribution of the responses (with an average satisfaction level of approximately 
8), it is not possible to further distinguish among those with lower satisfaction levels. The 
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results (available on request) do not change significantly were we to divide the group of 
satisfied workers into mid- (5–8) and high-level (8+). 
Fig. 2 Probability of entering into a first union by employment condition and satisfaction. 
Average Marginal Effects 
 
Note. Reference category: Permanent position and high level of satisfaction. Model controlling for age (quadratic 
form), level of education, occupational level and parental background. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * 
p-value < 0.1 
 
Perceived uncertainty: Chances of losing one’s job. Perceived job uncertainty refers to the 
probability of losing one’s job. The results from model 2 (see Table 4 - Model 2) suggest the 
presence of a nonlinear relationship between perceived uncertainty and union formation. Once 
the level of uncertainty in job security begins to increase, so does the likelihood of starting a 
union decline (AME of approximately -0.01 in Model 2 for both men and women). However, 
this probability increases again after a certain level (50% in our case).  
Model 3 examines both actual and perceived constraints (Figure 3, and Table 4 for complete 
results). The reference category is someone with a clear and stable condition, namely, an 
individual with an ongoing position who declares a 0% chance of losing their job in the next 
year. Except for those with ongoing contracts, this non-monotonous pattern of the association 
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between perceived uncertainty and entrance in first union is observed both for casual and 
fixed-term workers of both genders. 
Fig. 3 Probability of entering into first union by employment condition and perceived job 
uncertainty. Average Marginal Effect  
 
Note. Reference category: Permanent position and no chance of losing job. For readability purposed AME for 
those self-employed, unemployed or outside labor force are not reported. Model controlling for age (quadratic 
form), level of education, occupational level and parental background. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * 
p-value < 0.1 
 
Perceived uncertainty: Probability of finding a job. A state of unemployment was typically 
associated with the lowest probability of starting a union in the following year. That said, the 
perceived chances of reemployment are important (see Figure 4 or Table 5 for the full 
results). Both men and women seem to first focus on family formation during times of high 
uncertainty in the labor market—something particularly visible among women. The results 
were in line with an uncertainty reduction narrative (Friedman et al. 1994). Increasing the 
perceived chances of finding a job (i.e., reducing uncertainty), had the effect of reducing 
unemployment’s negative impact. Highly discouraged female workers (unemployed women 
who reported a below 10% probability of finding a job) reported high chances of starting a 
union.  
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Fig. 4 Probability of entering into a first union by perceived chances of finding a job. Average 
Marginal Effects 
 
Note. Reference category: Unemployed and very optimistic (80% and more) of finding a job. Model controlling 
for age (quadratic form), level of education, occupational level and parental background. *** p-value < 0.01, ** 
p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1 
 
Robustness checks 
The results remained substantively unchanged after our running of several robustness checks 
(available upon request). In terms of the statistical model and sample used, to control that the 
effect was not solely age-related, we re-ran the analysis to include individuals up to the age of 
50. Rather than looking at the condition only from the previous wave, we used the 
employment uncertainty from the two previous years (t-1 and t-2). While we excluded those 
in education during the entire observational period from our analytical sample, including also 
these cases (449), the results remain similar. This study considers three different measures of 
uncertainty. In order to have the same analytic sample over the different specifications, we 
included only the cases (the wave) in which the information on all the key measures were 
available. We re-ran the model without imposing this constraint either by using a different 
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sample for each model or imputing the missing values. Once again, the results remained 
unchanged.  
Furthermore, we tested different cut-off points for the subjective measures of uncertainty. For 
example, we recoded the chance of finding job as 0–20, 20–40, 40–60, 60–80, 80% and over. 
We further differentiated between those satisfied with their job security into two categories: 
mid- (5–7) and highly-satisfied (8+). Alternatively, while keeping two categories, we changed 
the cut-off point to 8. The perception of losing one’s job was split into five categories instead 
of three: no chance, 1–20%, 20–40%, 40–60%, 60–80%, 80% chance and over. Due to the 
distribution of the responses and the fact that the questions were posed only to those already 
concerned with their positions (i.e., the question around chance of finding a job was asked 
only to unemployed/active job seekers; and satisfaction of job security and the chance of 
losing one’s job only to employees), we cannot simply use the numeric scale available in the 
survey.   
As mentioned above, instead of considering a first union as either a legal marriage or de facto 
relationship, we ran both a competing risk model to distinguish between the two types of 
unions and considering only the transition to a legal marriage as first union formation event. 
No substantive differences were found.  
 
Conclusions 
The current study is one of the first attempts to examine the effect of uncertainty on family 
formations in a dynamic, prospective, and multidimensional manner. Using detailed 
information on contract types—considered to be a marker of objective measure of 
uncertainty—along with perceived uncertainty about the future, we were able to open the 
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black box, as it were, of the heterogeneous group of temporary workers and the role of 
perceived uncertainty. 
The temporary workers group should not be regarded as a monolith, and selection into union 
was instead observed according to the level of uncertainty individuals face. In Australia, 
casual workers—despite usually enjoying a wage premium to wage premium to compensate 
unstable hours worked and the absence of entitlements to various employment benefits —are 
those who feel more precarious in our sample. These results are in line with those of 
Buddelmeyer et al. (2015) that found causal workers having the lowest level of job 
satisfactions among non-standard workers. Indeed, both men and women delayed entrance 
into first union at similar rates to those observed for unemployed respondents. 
The relationship between uncertainty and family formation seems to be nonlinear—being 
uncertain does not necessary delay union formation. Our results highlight the presence of 
three “levels” of uncertainty, displaying a sort of U shape relationship between uncertainty 
and accelerated union formation. 
Low uncertainty: This is the “ideal” situation for forming a union. Our results support the 
empirical evidence behind the socioeconomic union formation differential. Those with better 
economic prospects—such as low actual and perceived levels of employment uncertainty—
are more attractive on the marriage market. Also among those who are unemployed and then 
by definition with a disadvantage labor market positioning, increasing the chances of finding 
a job (i.e., reducing their uncertainty) brings to an increase chance of entrance into first union. 
In line with the literature on second demographic transition (e.g., Blossfeld 1995; Goldstein 
and Kenney 2001), we found evidence to suggest that working and economic security seem to 
enhance marriage chances among both men and women in a similar fashion. This would 
suggest, at least in an Australian context, the existence of gender equality towards chances of 
union formation in the presence of labor market uncertainty. 
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High uncertainty: In cases of very high uncertainty, individuals tend to invest their resources 
into family formation—a fact possibly due to their being discouraged by the situation in the 
labor market. This is particularly strong among women. Our empirical results highlight this 
while looking at the perception of finding a job in the next 12 months among the unemployed. 
This result (visible especially among women) seems to be in line with an uncertainty 
reduction narrative (Friedman et al. 1994). Women have a tendency to “focus” primarily on 
family life if the uncertainty of the labor market is too high. 
Middle uncertainty: When the state of the labor market is ambiguous, union formation is 
typically postponed. This is coherent with the uncertainty hypothesis of Oppenheimer (1988). 
Regarding objective uncertain situations, in terms of unemployment or temporary (casual) 
jobs, individuals tent to delay union formation. This could be due to an inability to predict 
how the married life will be and if there would be able to economically contribute to it. A 
similar behavior was observed among people somewhat uncertain about their futures. We 
found evidence of delayed union formation among the unemployed who were only partially 
discouraged in finding suitable employment opportunities (“discouraged of finding a job”), as 
well as the employed who partly worried about losing their job in the foreseeable future (less 
than 50% of losing job). When individuals are uncertain about their work, but still have a 
chance to either exit unemployment or retain their jobs, they may decide to invest their 
(material and immaterial) resources on the labor market while reducing those for the marriage 
market.   
In Australia, entry into marriage (legal or de facto) is a step more likely to be taken by those 
with strong economic prospects, or envisaged by those with very poor employment prospects 
who regard union as a sign of stability in an otherwise unstable life situation. This potential, 
non-linear path dependency between union formation and employment uncertainty might help 
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reconcile some contrasting empirical findings. It offers an interesting and alternative view 
from which to understand the economic uncertainty/family formation nexus. 
Additionally, our study advances the importance of considering—besides structural 
employment conditions and their subjective perception—how different future expectations 
influence family formation decisions. In sociological and demographic studies, “economic 
uncertainty” remains an elusive and highly debated notion, often operationalized by 
unfavorable labor market conditions. In economics, it is identified by the inability to assign 
probabilities to outcomes influencing one’s own economic situation (Beckert 1996; Knight 
1921), which in turn leads to uncertainty about future economic prospects (Bloom, 2014). Yet 
the need for decision-making remains even if uncertainty hinders the possibility of a rational 
calculation regarding future events (Beckert and Bronk 2018). Our results suggest that future 
expectations, and the ability to anticipate different scenarios in the employment sphere, play a 
major role in union formation. The use of prospective measures of uncertainty thus offers a 
promising path of inquiry for the study of family life courses in the era of uncertainty. 
Importantly, individuals have shown themselves to have a sound grasp over their level of 
uncertainty: the HILDA panel design allowed us to verify that those more worried about 
losing their job were in fact at a higher risk of actual job loss. 
While our findings have contributed to the literature on employment uncertainty and family 
formation, our study is not without its limitations. First, marital status is self-reported. An 
individual might be in a stable long-term relationship, either living together or apart, in 
something akin to a de facto relationship but may not report it as it is often not compulsory to 
do so. This may well have led to the under-reporting of cases of union formation. 
Nevertheless, considering only legal marriages for the robustness check showed that the 
patterns remained similar. Second, and despite the fact that subjective evaluations are 
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backdated by one year, the perception of uncertainty might still be endogenous with respect to 
the chances of union formation. A person in a stable relationship—a condition that may 
accelerate the likelihood of starting a union per se—could well underestimate their level of 
uncertainty on the labor market. Vice-versa, those who have an unstable or no relationship 
(or, those “uncertain” of their family life) may tend to project and overestimate their 
uncertainty onto the labor market. Third, selection issues may have been present due to latent 
traits such as personality, risk propensity, or intelligence that may have been associated with 
“success” both on the marriage and labor market. Finally, due to the small-scale sample size, 
we could not further distinguish the workers according to job prestige. However, we could 
expect that, among the heterogeneous group of temporary workers, those with highly skilled 
and top-level professions may be more materially and immaterially wealthy so as to aid a 
successful performance on the union market. In any event, our multivariate model controlled 
for the level of education and ISCO classification of the current/recent job as proxy for skills 
level.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study provides evidence for the heterogeneity of 
family behavior of temporary and non-temporary workers, and of the relevance for including 
perceptions of uncertainty while studying family-related behaviors. We advance existing 
research on family life course by looking at the first critical step of family formation, namely 
the transition into first union—as opposed to other studies that have focused directly on 
fertility behaviors. Our results cannot be reconciled with any notion of a simple, uniform, and 
unidirectional relationship between uncertainty and union formation. Instead, they emphasize 
the need for a multi-dimensional approach. We conclude that the sole use of objective 
measures (structural constraints) gives only a partial, and perhaps inaccurate, perspective. The 
specter of the future appears central to union formation behaviors—at least in Australia.  
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TABLES 
Table 1. Subjective and objective uncertainty measure by gender. Pooled data 
 Female Male 
Objective measure: type of contract   
Not in Labor Force (LF) 8.38% 6.79% 
Unemployed 14.43% 17.06% 
Permanent 27.93% 35.24% 
Fixed-term 6.24% 7.51% 
Casual Basis 41.47% 30.28% 
Self-employed 1.55% 3.11% 
   
Subjective measures   
Satisfaction of job security (0–10)* 8.06 (1.9) 8.05 (SD 1.88) 
Percent chance of losing a job (0–100)* 11.17 (SD 38.00) 12.30 (SD 37.63) 
Percent chance of finding a job (0–100)** 72.67(SD 26.61) 73.53 (SD 25.5) 
   
Subjective measure recoded   
Satisfaction Job security   
Not in LF/Unemployed 22.81% 23.85% 
Low satisfied: 0–5 7.71% 7.58% 
High satisfied 5+ 67.93% 65.46% 
Self-employed 1.55% 3.11% 
Percent chance of losing job   
Not in LF/Unemployed 22.81% 23.85% 
Self-employed 1.55% 3.11% 
No chance (0%) 40.80% 34.85% 
Low chance (1–49%) 28.74% 31.49% 
High chance (50%+) 6.10% 6.70% 
Percent chance of finding a job   
Employed 77.19% 76.15% 
Not working, not looking for job 6.49% 5.24% 
Heavily Discouraged (0–10%) 0.75% 0.73% 
Discouraged (10–50%) 4.02% 4.16% 
Optimistic (50–80%) 5.29% 6.92% 
Very optimistic (80%+) 6.26% 6.80% 
Note: The percentage refers to the lagged value as used in the multivariate model. 
  * refers only to employees; ** the respondent is a job seeker.  
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Table 2. Perceived uncertainty at previous wave and current employment condition. Pooled 
data. Percentage by row 
 Current employment condition 
 Unemployed/Outside 
Labor Force 
Employed 
Satisfaction of job security (t-1)   
Low satisfied (0–5) 17.22 82.78 
High satisfied (6–10) 11.43 88.57 
   
Percent Chance of Losing a Job (t-1)   
No chance of losing job (0%) 11.29 88.71 
1–50% chance of losing job 11.60 88.40 
50% and more chance of losing job  18.33 81.67 
   
Percent Chance of Finding a Job (t-1)   
Heavily Discouraged (0–10%) 64.48 35.52 
Discouraged (10–50%) 52.27 47.73 
Optimistic (50–80%) 44.64 55.36 
Very optimistic (80%+) 31.82 68.18 
   
Employment condition (t-1)   
Fixed terms 10.30 89.70 
Casual basis 16.18 83.82 
Permanent 7.79 92.21 
Self-employed 15.80 84.20 
Not employed 43.48 56.52 
Note: the question regarding percent chance of finding a job was asked to those currently unemployed and active 
in the labor market. The questions on chance of losing employment and job security satisfaction were asked to 
those currently working.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 3. Probability of entering a first union. Subjective measure: Satisfaction of job security. 
Average Marginal Effects. Stratified by gender 
 
 Men Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Objective 
condition – 
Type of 
contract 
Subjective 
measure – 
Satisfaction 
job security  
Type of 
contract and 
subjective 
measure 
Objective 
condition 
– Type of 
contract 
Subjective 
measure – 
Satisfaction 
job security  
Type of 
contract, 
subjective 
measure 
Type of contract (t-1) 
Ref. Permanent 
      
Not in LF -0.063***   -0.053***   
 (0.014)   (0.012)   
Unemployed -0.025***   -0.043***   
 (0.007)   (0.010)   
Fixed-term 0.001   -0.011   
 (0.008)   (0.010)   
Casual basis -0.023***   -0.035***   
 (0.006)   (0.007)   
Self-employed 0.006   -0.003   
 (0.010)   (0.019)   
Satisfaction of job security (t-1) 
Ref. High satisfaction (5+) 
      
Not employed (Not LF/Unemployed)  -0.024***   -0.029***  
  (0.006)   (0.008)  
Self-employed  0.011   0.009  
  (0.010)   (0.019)  
Low satisfied (0–5)  0.000   -0.022**  
  (0.008)   (0.010)  
Type of Contract and Satisfaction Job 
Security (t-1) 
Ref. Permanent position and high satisfaction 
      
Not in LF   -0.062***   -0.056*** 
   (0.014)   (0.012) 
Unemployed   -0.024***   -0.046*** 
   (0.007)   (0.010) 
Self-employed   0.007   -0.006 
   (0.010)   (0.019) 
Fixed-term: Low satisfied (0–5)   -0.010   -0.034 
   (0.020)   (0.022) 
Fixed-term: High satisfied (5+)   0.003   -0.009 
   (0.008)   (0.011) 
Casual: Low satisfied (0–5)   -0.015   -0.031** 
   (0.012)   (0.013) 
Casual: High satisfied (5+)   -0.024***   -0.039*** 
   (0.006)   (0.007) 
Permanent: Low satisfied (0–5)   0.003   -0.065*** 
   (0.011)   (0.024) 
DEMOGRAPHICS       
Age 0.047*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.056*** 0.059*** 0.056*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Level of Education 
Ref. Compulsory or below 
      
Diploma 0.007 0.009* 0.008 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Bachelor or above 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.013 0.014* 0.013 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Current or most recent job skill level 
Ref. High Skilled white collar 
      
Low skilled blue collar (ISCO codes 8 and 9) -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.008 (0.014) -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) -0.012 (0.014) 
High skilled blue collar (ISCO codes 6 and 7) -0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.046 (0.011) -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.028) -0.048* (0.012) 
Low skilled white collar (ISCO codes 4 and 5) -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.015** -0.016** (0.028) -0.047* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) -0.019*** (0.028) 
Parental background. Job skill level 
Ref. High skilled white collar 
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 Men Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Objective 
condition – 
Type of 
contract 
Subjective 
measure – 
Satisfaction 
job security  
Type of 
contract and 
subjective 
measure 
Objective 
condition 
– Type of 
contract 
Subjective 
measure – 
Satisfaction 
job security  
Type of 
contract, 
subjective 
measure 
Parents. Low skilled blue collar 0.023*** 0.018** 0.017** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Parents. High skilled blue collar 0.019** 0.017** 0.017** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Parents. Low skilled white collar 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.018** 0.019*** 0.018** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Parents. No info 0.011 0.013 0.012 -0.004 -0.003 0.029*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) 0.030*** (0.010) 
       
Number of individuals 3,128 3,128 3,128 2,727 2,727 2,727 
Number of observations 13,520 13,520 13,520 11,255 11,255 11,255 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Note: Since job security satisfaction was asked only to the employed, we added two additional categories to account for unemployed or self-
employed respondents. 
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Table 4. Probability of entering a first union. Subjective Measure: Probability of losing a job. 
Average Marginal Effects. Stratified by gender 
 
 Men Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Objective 
condition – 
Type of 
contract 
Subjective 
measure – 
Chance of 
losing a job 
Type of 
contract and 
subjective 
measure 
Objective 
condition 
– Type of 
contract 
Subjective 
measure – 
Chance of  
losing job 
Type of 
contract,  
subjective 
measure 
Type of contract (t-1)       
Ref. Permanent        
Not in LF -0.063***   -0.053***   
 (0.014)   (0.012)   
Unemployed -0.025***   -0.043***   
 (0.007)   (0.010)   
Fixed-term 0.001   -0.011   
 (0.008)   (0.010)   
Casual basis -0.023***   -0.035***   
 (0.006)   (0.007)   
Self-employed 0.006   -0.003   
 (0.010)   (0.019)   
Chance of losing job if employed (t-1) 
Ref: No chance (0%) of losing job 
      
Not employed (Not in LF/Unemployed)  -0.028***   -0.032***  
  (0.007)   (0.008)  
Self-employed  0.007   0.007  
  (0.010)   (0.019)  
Low chances (1–49%)  -0.009*   -0.013**  
  (0.005)   (0.006)  
High chances (50%+)  0.000   -0.001  
  (0.008)   (0.011)  
Type of contract and chance of losing job (t-
1) 
Ref: Permanent position and 0% chance of 
losing job 
      
Not in LF   -0.066***   -0.054*** 
   (0.014)   (0.013) 
Unemployed   -0.028***   -0.044*** 
   (0.008)   (0.010) 
Self-employed   0.003   -0.004 
   (0.011)   (0.019) 
Fixed-term: 0% chance of losing job   0.002   0.005 
   (0.011)   (0.014) 
Fixed-term: 1–49% chance of losing job   -0.010   -0.049** 
   (0.012)   (0.020) 
Fixed-term: 50%+ chance of losing job   0.000   0.001 
   (0.019)   (0.020) 
Casual: 0% chance of losing job   -0.025***   -0.030*** 
   (0.008)   (0.009) 
Casual: 1–49% chance of losing job   -0.036***   -0.045*** 
   (0.009)   (0.010) 
Casual: 50%+ chance of losing job   -0.007   -0.032* 
   (0.013)   (0.017) 
Permanent: 1–49% chance of losing job   -0.007   -0.003 
   (0.007)   (0.009) 
Permanent: 50%+ chance of losing job   -0.008   0.004 
   (0.012)   (0.018) 
DEMOGRAPHICS       
Age 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.056*** 0.059*** 0.056*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Level of Education 
Ref. Compulsory or below 
      
Diploma 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Bachelor or above 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.013 0.014* 0.014* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Current or most recent job skill level 
Ref. High skilled white collar 
      
Low skilled blue collar (ISCO codes 8 and 9) -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.008 -0.012 -0.007 
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 Men Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Objective 
condition – 
Type of 
contract 
Subjective 
measure – 
Chance of 
losing a job 
Type of 
contract and 
subjective 
measure 
Objective 
condition 
– Type of 
contract 
Subjective 
measure – 
Chance of  
losing job 
Type of 
contract,  
subjective 
measure 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
High skilled blue collar (ISCO codes 6 and 7) -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.046 -0.047* -0.046 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Low skilled white collar (ISCO codes 4 and 5) -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.016** -0.019*** -0.015** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Parental background. Job skill level 
Ref. High skilled white collar 
      
Parents. Low skilled blue collar 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Parents. High skilled blue collar 0.019** 0.018** 0.018** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Parents. Low skilled white collar 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.018** 0.019*** 0.018** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Parents. No info 0.011 0.011 0.010 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
       
Number of individuals 3,128 3,128 3,128 2,727 2,727 2,727 
Number of observations 13,520 13,520 13,520 11,255 11,255 11,255 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Note: since the subjective measure is reported only for the employed, we added two additional categories in Model 2 to account for the self-
employed and unemployed. 
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Table 5. Probability of entering a first union. Subjective measure: Probability of finding a 
job. Average Marginal Effects. Stratified by gender 
 
 Men Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Objective 
condition 
– Type of 
contract 
Subjective 
measure – 
Finding a job 
Type of 
contract – 
Subjective 
measure 
Objective 
condition 
– Type of 
contract 
Subjective 
measure – 
Finding a job 
Type of 
contract – 
Subjective 
measure 
Type of contract (t-1)       
Ref. Permanent        
Not in LF -0.063***   -0.053***   
 (0.014)   (0.012)   
Unemployed -0.025***   -0.043***   
 (0.007)   (0.010)   
Fixed-term 0.001   -0.011   
 (0.008)   (0.010)   
Casual basis -0.023***   -0.035***   
 (0.006)   (0.007)   
Self-employed 0.006   -0.003   
 (0.010)   (0.019)   
Chances of finding a job if unemployed (t-
1) 
Ref: Very optimistic (80% or more) 
      
Employed  -0.006   0.033**  
  (0.009)   (0.013)  
Not working and not looking for a job  -0.053***   -0.007  
  (0.017)   (0.018)  
Heavily discouraged (0–10%)  -0.054   0.063**  
  (0.038)   (0.030)  
Discouraged (10–50%)  -0.071***   0.011  
  (0.020)   (0.020)  
Optimistic (50–80%)  -0.035**   0.014  
  (0.014)   (0.019)  
Type of contract and perception of chances 
of finding a job if unemployed (t-1) 
Ref: Very optimistic of finding a job 
(80%+) 
      
Not working, not looking for a job   -0.053***   -0.007 
   (0.017)   (0.018) 
Heavily discouraged (0–10%)   -0.053   0.065** 
   (0.038)   (0.030) 
Discouraged (10–50%)   -0.070***   0.011 
   (0.020)   (0.020) 
Optimistic (50–80%)   -0.036**   0.013 
   (0.014)   (0.019) 
Fixed-term   0.004   0.042*** 
   (0.011)   (0.016) 
Causal basis   -0.021**   0.018 
   (0.010)   (0.014) 
Permanent   0.002   0.053*** 
   (0.009)   (0.014) 
Self-employed   0.009   0.050** 
   (0.013)   (0.023) 
DEMOGRAPHICS       
Age 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.056*** 0.059*** 0.056*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Level of Education 
Ref. Compulsory or below 
      
Diploma 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Bachelor or above 0.017*** 0.015** 0.016** 0.013 0.014* 0.014* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Current or most recent job skill level 
Ref. High Skilled white collar 
      
Low skilled blue collar -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.017** -0.008 -0.015 -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
High skilled blue collar -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.046 -0.048* -0.046* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Low skilled white collar -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.016** -0.020*** -0.016** 
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 Men Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Objective 
condition 
– Type of 
contract 
Subjective 
measure – 
Finding a job 
Type of 
contract – 
Subjective 
measure 
Objective 
condition 
– Type of 
contract 
Subjective 
measure – 
Finding a job 
Type of 
contract – 
Subjective 
measure 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Parental background. Job skill level 
Ref. High skilled white collar 
      
Parents. Low skilled blue collar 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Parents. High skilled blue collar 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Parents. Low skilled white collar 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.018** 0.019*** 0.018** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Parents. No info 0.011 0.012 0.011 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
       
Number of individuals 3,128 3,128 3,128 2,727 2,727 2,727 
Number of observations 13,520 13,520 13,520 11,255 11,255 11,255 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Note: since the subjective measure is reported only for the unemployed, we added two additional categories in Model 2 to account for the 
inactive or employed (of any type). 
 
